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McQUAIL v. SHELL OIL CO.: DELAYED ZONING OR
FLOATING ZONE?
In McQuail v. Shell Oil Co.,' the Supreme Court of Delaware held
that rezoning orders in New Castle County need not be "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan ' 2 since neither the Delaware Constitution3 nor
the state enabling act 4 requires it. The court also held that some sort of
plan is required, 5 but the zoning plan required by statute is all that is
necessary, and the reclassification in question did bear a reasonable relation
to the scheme of zoning adopted in that plan. The Shell case is noteworthy
7
for at least two reasons. The first is that Delaware, unlike most jurisdictions,
has no requirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan." The second concerns the "floating zone ' 8 concept which seems to be
implicit in the New Castle County Zoning Code.9 It is the purpose of this
Case Note to review the court's reasoning as to what type plan is required for
zoning in that county and to examine the floating-zone idea in the Zoning
Code in light of the cases in other jurisdictions dealing with the concept.
The floating-zone concept will be examined with a view toward its compatibility with the traditional concept of spot zoning' ° and with respect to the
special problems existing in zoning for undeveloped areas and for industrial
1. - Del. -, 183 A.2d 572 (1962), affirming Dukes v. Shell Oil Co., 177 A.2d
785 (Del. Ch. 1962).
2. The origin of the "comprehensive plan" requirement is in DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE: A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926), found in 2 RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 877-82 (3d ed. 1957). See generally Haar, In
Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
3. DEi.. CONST. art. 2, § 25.
4. DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2601-23 (1953).
5.

-

6.

DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,

Del. at -,

183 A.2d at 578.

§§ 2607-08 (1953).
7. Haar, supra note 2, at 1155 n.6, 1156 n.9, 1157 n.14.
8. Also referred to as "flexible selective zoning" in Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) and "open development zoning" in Note, 40
MINN. L. REV. 286, 288 (1956).
9. The Zoning Code was adopted on September 28, 1954, by the Levy Court of
New Castle County pursuant to DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2610 (1953). The Zoning
Code was first prepared by the New Castle County Zoning Commission in accordance
with DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2607-08 (1953), for submission to the Levy Court.
On July 26, 1955, the Levy Court amended the basic code with regard to the area in
question and designated it primarily as an R-2 (Agriculture and General Purposes)
district.
10. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
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development. The conclusion will suggest what the role of the Delaware
courts should be with regard to this floating-zone-type provision.
In late 1960 and early 1961, the Shell Oil Company purchased options
on approximately 3,345 acres of farmland 1 in lower New Castle County
along the Delaware Bay with a view toward the construction of an eighty
million dollar refinery development. The optioned land comprised two large,
irregularly shaped tracts with a "corridor" between. All the acreage involved had been zoned R-2 (Agriculture and. General Purposes) by the
Levy Court 12 of New Castle County in 1954 when it adopted the basic
Zoning Code and regulations for those portions of the county lying outside
the municipalities. Shell and the owners of the land petitioned the New Castle
County Zoning Commission in May, 1961, to have the optioned land reclassified to M-3 (Heavy Industry). After a hearing, the majority of the
commission recommended 1" the rezoning action to the Levy Court of New
Castle County which, after another hearing, made the legislative decision to
rezone only 2,62514 acres of the lands held on option by Shell. On September
11, 1961, plaintiffs' 5 brought action in the Court of Chancery to enjoin the
rezoning order, contending, inter alia, (1) that the action of the Levy Court
was arbitrary and capricious, (2) that rezoning in a "checkerboard pattern"
was flagrant spot zoning and (3) that the Levy Court had not rezoned in
11. In the hearing before the New Castle County Zoning Commission, an attorney
for Shell commented as follows:
At the present time only 40 percent of this land is tillable at all, and only
eight percent is rated by the University of Delaware's agricultural experiment
station as first-rate farmland.
Most of the people who live within this area have other jobs and very few
of them live on farming alone.
There are 2,500 acres, approximately, that are swamp. And I might add, not
only the swamp wouldn't support five men per acre, but . . . they tell me it
will not support five muskrats on it.

Brief for Appellees, app. p. B39.
12. A Levy Court in Delaware is not a judicial body but is a county commission
consisting of three elected commissioners. The Levy Court is created by statute and
has limited power to contract and zone. See generally DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 30179 (1953). The Supreme Court of Delaware held, in Auditorium Inc. v. Board of
Adjustment, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 373, "91 A.2d 528 (1952), that zoning is a legislative
matter which the General Assembly has delegated to the legislative body of the political
subdivision.
13. Two members voted for rezoning and one against. The dissenting member
favored the rezoning generally but thought that something less than the entire area in
Shell's petition should be rezoned at this time. - Del. at -, 183 A.2d at 575.
14. The portion not rezoned was largely swamp area which was to be leased to
the Delaware Fish and Game Commission and was not desired for industrial development. According to Shell, the area was sought primarily as a water supply. Brief for
Appellees, pp. 32-33.
15. Originally there were ten plaintiffs who owned farmland or- were residents in
the vicinity of the rezoned area. Before the appeal eight had withdrawn leaving only
two plaintiffs remaining "who reside some distance from the area involved." - Del.
at -, 183 A.2d at 575 n.1.
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terms of a plan for the area.'
Zoning Code is as follows:

The relevant portion of the New Castle

While R-2 districts are designated as one of the R districts,
they include large undeveloped areas for which the ultimate purpose
cannot now be determined. It is expected that as the development
of New Castle County takes place, portions of these R districts
will be required for other uses. Requests for rezoning such portions
(of R-2) as residential, commercial or industrial districts will be
studied and acted upon on their own merits ....17
Shell argued: (1) that the Delaware statute does not require the formulation
of or adherence to a plan separate from the required Zoning Code; (2) that
the Zoning Code, which provided for the area to be temporarily zoned R-2
with future rezoning requests to be acted upon individually, was adhered to;
and (3) that judicial review should be limited to abuse of discretion, the
test being similar to that employed in considering the constitutional validity
of a statute.' 8
The lower court held that some sort of plan was contemplated and
required by the Delaware statute " in spite of the fact that no express mention
is made . . .of a comprehensive plan,"' 19 and went on to equate the plan
with "due consideration given to the public welfare. ' 20 The supreme court
took the more definite position, however, that the Zoning Code was the
plan, and if the rezoning action bore a reasonable relation to that "scheme of
zoning," the order was valid as to the plan requirement. The court found
a reasonable relation between the rezoning order and the Zoning Code since
the original zoning was meant to be temporary in nature. The only question
then remaining was whether the action of the Levy Court was arbitrary and
unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion as determined by the
facts and circumstances of the case. 2 1 The court found that the presence of
industry is designed to serve the general welfare, and concluded that the
decision of the Levy Court was "a fairly debatable one upon which it had
the exclusive legislative judgment.1

22

16. The reasoning as a whole shows that the majority of the Levy Court gave
no consideration to the larger questions involved in the zoning of two such
large tracts of land. They gave no thought to planning for the entire surround-

ing area, the possibility of zoning only a part M-3 and making concentric
circles of other zones. They apparently gave no consideration to the captive
land that was going to be entirely surrounded by Shell M-3 areas or the adjacent land. There appears to have been for them simply a black and white
question: Shell or nothing.
Brief for Appellants, pp. 18-19.
17. Zoning Code of New Castle County, art. IV, § 2, quoted in McQuail v. Shell
Oil Co., supra note 1, at -, 183 A.2d at 577-78.
18. Brief for Appellee, pp. 10-25.
19. 177 A.2d at 791.
20. Ibid.
21. - Del. at -, 183 A.2d at 579.
22. Id. at -, 183 A.2d at 580.
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It is significant that the court avoided consideration of the substantive
merits of the plan itself, saying:
[T]he basic zoning Code recognized that the R-2 classification for
Blackbird Hundred was not permanent. The fact that further rezoning was necessary because the plan was incomplete as to certain
lands not rezoned supports the action taken. When an R-2 classification was adopted the ultimate zoning of such area was in effect
delayed. The proper authorities have now acted and this action must
2
be upheld unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 3
Indeed, the court appears to be taking the curious position that the land
was never really zoned. A later statement seems to bear this out: "Good
housekeeping suggests a realistic approach to a growing area by planning for
an orderly development using the present embryonic industrial complex as
the center from which planned development may grow with logic." '2

4

Also,

the court did not consider the issue of the differently zoned corridor of land
between the two tracts rezoned. Since the court has announced that the
legislature intended zoning to be in accordance with a plan and since it may
well be difficult to convince many that having no definite plan is the plan, the
remaining portion of this Case Note will be devoted to an examination of
the "plan" and an analysis of its merits.
To begin with, zoning according to some sort of plan is at least desirable,
since zoning is a means to the goals of planned community development
as it affects property rights and of general welfare derived from community
purpose and efficient government.2 5 The value of zoning lies in its effective
use as a device for implementing planned future development toward those
ends. Effective zoning of undeveloped areas without strait jacketing the
future yet without running afoul of constitutional limitations has become
one of the most perplexing of modern problems, and has emphasized the basic
need for flexibility in zoning techniques.2 6 One device recently accepted by
a few courts2 7 is that of the "floating zone," which may be generally
described as follows:
Usually the idea of floating zones refers to a specialized type of
district classification which is not necessarily placed anywhere on
the zoning map at the time such classification is written into the
text of the zoning ordinance. The district exists as a concept in the
zoning ordinance, but figuratively floats above the landscape, in no
fixed position, until it is brought down to earth by a boundarychange rezoning amendment.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at -, 183 A.2d at 578. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at -, 183 A.2d at 579.
See Haar, supra note 2, at 1154-55.
See Reps, The Zoning of Undeveloped Areas, 3
Cases cited notes 29, 31 and 33 infra.

SYRACUSE

L. REv. 292 (1952).
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Floating zone systems commonly, but not necessarily, may
involve provisions in the zoning ordinance which openly invite
petitions for the floating zone to be filed by persons whose development proposals meet stated conditions. Some floating zone approaches
may not label the individualized approach quite so frankly, however .2 s
Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown2 9 is considered a leading case on this
subject although the term "floating zone" was not employed. The Court of
Appeals of New York, with one justice dissenting, held valid a 1947
Tarrytown ordinance amendment which created a new class of residential
zone for garden-type apartments. The actual boundaries of the zone were
neither delineated in the ordinance nor fixed on a map at the time. In response
to defendant's individual application, the new zone was applied specifically
to her property by another amendment approved a year and a half later.
The court said:
While stability and regularity are undoubtedly essential to the
operation of zoning plans, zoning is by no means static. Changed or
changing conditions call for changed plans and persons who own
property in a particular zone or use district enjoy no eternally vested
right to that classification if the public interest demands otherwise.30
Since the Rogers case, the principle of the floating zone has also been approved
in Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals,3 1 where the Maryland Supreme Court
upheld a floating-zone provision in the Baltimore County zoning regulations.
The provision permitted scattering, throughout undeveloped areas of the
county, tracts of five acres or more on which "very light and unoffensive
manufacturing operations" 32 would be permitted, and each case was to be
judged on its own merits. The Huff decision was followed in Costello v.
Sieling,33 in which the Maryland Supreme Court upheld a similar floatingzone idea consisting of two ordinances. The first zoning amendment created a
T-2 (Trailer Coach Park) district, and a second amendment, which was
solicited by individual application, reclassified a tract from residential to
the T-2 classification. The rezoned area in the Costello case was surrounded
by and adjacent to properties devoted to residential and agricultural uses and
to the operation of sand and gravel pits.
It is clear from the wording of the Zoning Code in the Shell case
28. Craig, Particularized Zoning: Alterations While You Wait, 1 PROCEEDINGS
1960 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING (The Southwestern Legal Founda-

OF THE

tion) 153, 173 (1961).
29. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
30. Id. at 121, 96 N.E.2d at 733.
31. 214 Md.48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
32. Diecraft Inc. wanted to build a "one-story plant to be used for the manufacture
and assembly of small precision instruments, guided missile parts and electrical and
communication devices for the Federal Government." Id. at 51, 133 A.2d at 84-85.
33. 223 Md. 24, 161 A.2d 824 (1960).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

that it contemplates a temporary zoning plan, and it would seem to embody
principles strikingly similar to the essential characteristics of the floatingzone concept.3 4 The county Zoning Code mentions the broad categories of
residential, commercial and industrial districts which are not located on the
zoning map, yet are possibly projected for that area, and specific provision is
made for individual requests for rezoning to be acted upon on their own
merits. In other words, each district exists "as a concept in the zoning
ordinance, but figuratively floats above the landscape, in no fixed position,
until it is brought down to earth by a boundary-change rezoning amendment."

8 5

The language of the New York and Maryland courts indicates that
flexibility is perhaps one of the main virtues of the floating-zone device.
The Delaware court had the same idea in mind when it said:
In light of the nature of the land in the vicinity of the rezoned
area in Blackbird Hundred, the Commission and the Levy Court
could have reasoned as follows: It is inconceivable that men could at
this stage foretell the future use of this part of the county. To zone
lands in Blackbird not involved in the case as residential, as park
lands, or as industrial is not to plan the future but to dream it,
36
without any sound basis in fact.
The Rogers case involved an ordinance affecting a community wherein some
visible scheme of development was already in existence. In a more rural area,
such as was involved in the Shell case, where many lots, presently unoccupied
or used for agricultural purposes, are in close proximity to rapidly expanding communities, the need for general flexibility is even greater. The
problem the zoning ordinance was designed to combat in the Huff case more
nearly resembles the situation in the Shell case because undeveloped areas
were involved in both cases.
Another problem in zoning undeveloped areas is the difficulty of devising
flexible zoning controls adequate to meet the needs of industrial development.
Planners and developers advise local governments to predetermine specific
plans for such development.37 It is desirable, in many instances, to pick
specific locations or alternative sites for the concentration of industry so that
public utility requirements of industry can be provided more efficiently,
traffic problems confined to one or a few areas, specialized police, fire and
sanitation services better provided, and fair and equitable tax programs
34. Authority cited and text accompanying note 28 supra.
35. Craig, supra note 28, at 173.
36. - Del. at -, 183 A.2d at 579.
37. See Windsor, The Planning, Platting and Developing of an Industrial District,
1

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

1960

Legal Foundation) 79 (1961).

INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING

(The Southwestern
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more easily administered. 38 The effects of such planning are to attract new
industry and to encourage present industry to stay. Some guides that have
been suggested for considering potential sites for industrial development are:
(1) the area should promote personnel stability;39 (2) the area should
facilitate industrial activity through integrated transportation facilities and
sanitation and public utility services ;40 (3) the area should foster and promote
diversification of industry in order to achieve a high degree of economic
stability ;41 (4) the area should attract desirable industries rather than those
which utilize marginal labor ;42 and (5) the area should be subject to minimum site standards through restrictive covenants or zoning controls which are
43
flexible enough to meet the needs of technological change.
Where, however, it is either impossible or impractical to choose a
specific site in advance, the floating zone could be particularly useful as a
device to provide a legal framework within which the individual developer is
encouraged to locate the specific site which best meets the needs of his
particular industry and to apply for reclassification of the area. This outlook
44
was reflected in the report of the Zoning Commission in the Huff case.
45
Although a "new type industry" was involved in that case, no reason is
apparent why the same rationale is not equally valid for "old" industries
which formerly were objectionable because of their product or process but now,
due to research and technological development, have raised their level of performance. 40 Under certain conditions the use of the floating-zone device can
effectively solve many of the perplexing problems inherent in the uncertainty
of zoning for undeveloped areas and for industrial development and integration; however, the concept also has some very serious shortcomings which
have been forcefully presented by a few courts and which deserve attention
in some detail.
First, it is said that prospective buyers of property in areas subject to
38.
39.
40.
1956).
41.
42.

Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82-83; see Soule v. Town of Perinton, 152 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739 (Sup. Ct.
Windsor, supra note 37, at 85-86.

Id. at 86.

43. Id. at 83-85.
44. Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 31, at 54, 133 A.2d at 86.

45. See note 32 supra.
46. One noted authority in land-use planning has stated that professional planners
now tend, more and more, to classify industries by performance rather than process
or product, and the floating-zone device emphasizes standards of performance. Haar
& Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible
Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 1561 (1961). Much emphasis in the hearings on
Shell's petition was placed on expert testimony as to new developments in the petroleum industry with regard to water pollution, air pollution and conservation of natural
resources. See Brief for Appellees, app. p. B70.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

the floating zones cannot reasonably tell ahead of time the specific uses
for which the surrounding lands are planned, since the zoning maps of the
community do not indicate the future location of the floating zone. 47 Dissenting in the Rogers case, Justice Conway said:
[A] person purchasing property in Tarrytown in a Residence A
or B district to bring up his children now has no way of knowing
whether the property next to his may not become the site of a
multiple family dwelling with the attendant increase in population,
48
traffic dangers, commerce and congestion.
Other critics have said that, although a zoning order gives a property owner
no vested right in the continuation of existing uses, the scheme of zoning
should afford as much notice of change as possible. 49 The specific subject
of notice was not taken up by the Delaware court, but it appears from
Judge Stiftel's brief discussion of "delayed zoning" that the court felt that
the incomplete and temporary nature of the plan gave general notice that
the "proper authorities" would act in the future and thereby exert more
control over the areaY°
Second, the principle of piecemeal placement of zones in areas of
differently zoned districts incorporates one of the traditionally evil features of
spot zoning. 51 If spot zoning, defined in its descriptive sense, is "a carving
out of one or more properties located in a given use district and reclassifying
them in a different use district,' 5 2 the floating-zone process is particularly
vulnerable to charges of flagrant spot zoning. Defining spot zoning in the
descriptive sense emphasizes the size of the area rezoned and the fact that
the new classification is different from the surrounding districts. The floatingzone idea, on the other hand, suggests that where a floating zone is involved
the real evil in spot zoning is not the fact that the rezoned area is different
from the surrounding zones, but rather that rezoning was accomplished for
the benefit of an individual rather than for the general welfare. This
proposition assumes, however, that the land use of the new zone is compatible
with those of surrounding zones. From their analysis of the cases which
47. In Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 8, at 218, 164 A.2d at 11,
similar reasoning was used to invalidate a zoning amendment which included a
restricted manufacturing district not placed on the zoning map and which, after
presentation of a specific proposal, was applied to land formerly zoned residential.
48. Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 29, at 130, 96 N.E.2d at 738.
49. Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 8, at 218, 164 A.2d at 11.
50. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
51. See Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 29, at 128, 96 N.E.2d at
737 (dissenting opinion); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 8, at 218,
164 A.2d at 11.
52. Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 393, 18 A.2d 856, 858 (1941)
see Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957).
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have dealt with ordinances of the floating-zone type, Professor Haar and
Mrs. Hering suggest that the courts are possibly more willing to accept the
concept where it clearly appears that the legislative body has determined in
advance that the unplaced zone is compatible with the other zones in the ordinance.. 3 Furthermore, in the Huff case the zoning ordinance was sanctioned
on the basis that the advance legislative determination had been made that the
type district involved was compatible with residential development under
proper conditions. 54 In the Costello case, the court said, "Moreover, since the
trailer park area is also residential in character, it appears that the reclassification is neither incompatible nor inconsistent with the remainder of the
areas in the residential district." 55 The court in the Rogers case did not
deal with the compatibility of the zones as such, but it is apparent that the
court had compatibility in mind when it said: "The board undoubtedly
found . . . that garden apartments would blend more attractively and

harmoniously with the community setting, would impose less of a burden
upon village facilities, if placed upon larger tracts of land rather than scat'
tered about in small units." 56
On the other hand, Professor Haar and Mrs.
Hering have further observed that the floating-zone ordinance which was
invalidated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of Rockhill
v. Chesterfield Township57 was not based on an advance determination of
compatibility but seemed to be based on the principle that "compatibility
should be determined in terms of individual users and in light of circumstances existing at the time the new use is proposed. 5 8s Where the court
feels that a valid legislative determination has been made that the new use is
compatible with the surrounding use districts, the term "spot zoning" takes
on a somewhat specialized meaning and the emphasis shifts from defining
it in the descriptive sense to what has been called the mixed descriptive and
legal sense. 59 In the Rogers case, for example, the court said:
Defined as the process of singling out a small parcel of land for
a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding
area, for the benefit of the owners of such property and to the
detriment of other owners . . . "spot zoning"

is the very anti-

thesis of planned zoning. If therefore an ordinance is enacted in
53. Haar & Hering, supra note 46, at 1571-72; see Craig, supra note 28, at 179.
54. 214 Md. at 59, 133 A.2d at 89.
55. 223 Md. at 29, 161 A.2d at 826.
56. 302 N.Y. at 122-23, 96 N.E.2d at 734.
57. 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957) (invalidating an ordinance which zoned an
entire municipal area into agricultural and residence districts and provided for "all
manner of special uses" including "neighborhood business" and "light industrial" and
"other similar facilities," and which were to be placed by local discretion according to
certain conditions and specifications).
58. Haar & Hering, supra note 46, at 1572.
59. Annot., supra note 52.
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accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan, it is not "spot
zoning," even though it (1) singles out and affects but one small
plot . . . or (2) creates in the center of a large zone small areas
or districts devoted to a different use . . . . Thus the relevant

inquiry is not whether the particular zoning under attack consists
of areas fixed within larger areas of different use, but whether it
was accomplished for the benefit of individual owners rather than
pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the general welfare. 0
Notice that the New York court stresses who benefits from the rezoning
action rather than the size of the area rezoned or the fact that the method
involves a piecemeal technique. The reason is that where the differently
zoned district is compatible with the surrounding zones, the mere fact that it
is different does not, in itself, create harm. It thus appears that the true
dangers inherent within the floating-zone idea are favoritism to an individual
owner to the detriment of the general welfare and the lack of advance legislative determination that the floating zone is compatible with the other zones
in the ordinance or area. To the extent that a claim of "spot zoning" does not
safeguard against these dangers, it is not compatible with the concept of
the floating zone.
The Shell court defined spot zoning mainly in terms of its descriptive
sense when it said:
Plaintiff's argument that the Levy Court was guilty of spot
zoning in this instance cannot be sustained. The area involved in
the present amendment consists of 2,625 acres. "Spot Zoning"
is generally defined as an attempt to wrench a small lot or small
area from its environment and give it a new rating which disturbs
the tenor of the community .... 61
If the Delaware court had been concerned with the real evils of "delayed"
zoning, it is curious that they would have defined "spot zoning" on that
basis. However the brief resolution of this issue by the Delaware court does
state that although Shell benefited by the rezoning, the expansion and development of the industry in Delaware was "designed to serve the general
welfare" and not that of any individual or group. 62 Although the court did
not touch on the compatibility of the new zone with the others in the
Zoning Code or with the agricultural zone in particular, the court could have
had in mind that the Levy Court did consider the question of compatibility in
light of the circumstances existing at the time of the hearings on Shell's
application, since much emphasis was placed on technological advances in
60. Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 29, at 123-24, 96 N.E.2d at 734-35.
(Emphasis added.)
61. Del. at -,
183 A.2d at 579.
62. Id. at -, 183 A.2d at 579-80.
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the refining industry.6 3 In this respect an interesting comparison might be
drawn between the Shell case and the Chesterfield Township decision, which,
as previously suggested, 64 may have invalidated the floating-zone provision in
question on the basis of lack of advance legislative determination of compatibility.
The last major danger in the administration of such an ordinance is that
the personal motives of the commissioners or the political power of the applicants could have a decisive effect upon zoning decisions, thereby subordinating both benefit to the community as a whole and redistricting according
to the best use of the land.65 There is a fundamental and significant distinction between a situation where a zoning authority promulgates rules,
regulations and ordinances applicable to everyone and a situation where
ordinances are enacted which apply only to the property of the applicant on
a case-by-case basis. In the former, the authority exercises a legislative
function; in the latter, the board exercises primarily an adjudicative function.
Professor Davis writes as follows:
Intrinsically, rule making involves less danger of arbitrary
action and injustice than adjudication, because the results of adjudication may be unfair in all the ways that rules and regulations may
be unfair
and in addition may discriminate against the individual
66
party.
If an adjudication can arbitrarily deny individual rights in the absence of
proper safeguards, such procedure likewise can bestow favor upon an individual in a zoning action, thereby subordinating the best interests of the
public. We have already seen that where rules and regulations are promulgated which are meant to apply to everyone alike, the main function of a
claim of spot zoning should be to point out that a particular zoning action
benefits an individual rather than the general welfare. The Supreme Court of
the United States has said that local acts delegating the power to adjudicate
must set up standards to preclude discriminatory or arbitrary action by
officials. 67 Apprehensions of arbitrary and discriminatory actions in the
case of a floating-zone ordinance are clearly bottomed in the legal implications arising out of the case-by-case technique. 68 Professor Haar and Mrs.
63. See note 46 supra.
64. See authorities cited and text accompanying notes 57 and 58 supra.
65. Cases cited note 51 supra.
66. 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.11, at 122 (1958).
67. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
68. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequently discussed its decision in
Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960), as follows:
[I]n that case the zoning ordinance involved authorized changes on a caseby-case basis without any specified orderly planned use which meant in the
end that the utilization of the land became dependent upon the solicitation of
individual land owners and the unlimited discretion of the township supervisors.
Pumo v. Borough of Norristown, 404 Pa. 475, 478-79, 172 A.2d 828, 830 (1961).
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Hering have suggested that where adequate regulations prescribing specific
standards are set up in advance so that applications are passed upon more
objectively, the courts are more willing to validate the floating-zone ordinance.6 9 In the Rogers case, "exacting standards of size and physical layout" were prescribed in advance by the ordinance which initially created
the new zone. The opinion in the Costello70 case clearly indicates that the

court attached much weight to the fact that standards for a trailer park were
set out in advance and consisted of regulations as to design, layout, health
requirements, height and area. The court pointed out that these standards
should be met before a rezoning order allowing the establishment of the
new district would become effective. The court stated that the standards,
though not "elaborate," were "sufficiently definite" and certainly not "vague
and illusory." The court also said that the rezoning action "needed only to
have been fairly and reasonably within the scope of the regulations set forth
for the newly created T-2 zone to render the reclassification valid." 71 The
generally applied criteria and the additional safeguard of judicial review
72
should sufficiently protect against arbitrary and discriminatory action.
In other words, the theory with regard to the case-by-case aspect of the
floating-zone concept suggests a delicate balance between desired flexibility
through limited discretion of zoning boards and adequate safeguards against
arbitrary actions in the form of standards specifically pertaining to the unplaced zone and review by the courts.
The Zoning Code in the Shell case, like a typical floating-zone ordinance,
73
specifically invites individual applications and provides for action thereon.
With reference to the Zoning Code as a whole, the Delaware court pointed
out that the enabling act establishes adequate standards for the adoption of
74
zoning regulations.
The court felt that the provision which included a
69. Haar & Hering, supra note 46, at 1571.
70. Supra note 33.
71. Id. at 34, 161 A.2d at 829.
72. See Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 29.
73. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
74. DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2603(a) (1953) provides as follows:
(a) Regulations . . .shall be designated and adopted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or welfare
of the present and future inhabitants of this State, including amongst other
things, the lessening of congestion in the streets or roads or reducing the
waste of excessive amounts of roads, securing safety from fire and other
dangers, providing adequate light and air, preventing . . . excessive concentration of population and . .. excessive and wasteful scattering of population
or settlement, promoting such distribution of population and such classification
of land uses and distribution of land development and utilization as will tend
to facilitate and provide adequate provisions for public requirements, transportation, water flowage, water supply, drainage, sanitation, educational
opportunities, recreation, soil fertility, food supply, protection of the tax base,
securing economy in governmental expenditures, fostering the State's agricul-
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case-by-case determination was within the prescribed standards for legislative
action. It is possible that the Shell court has misconceived the function of the
Levy Court in this regard. The Levy Court has, in effect, legislated for itself
the power to decide cases on an individual basis, yet has provided no
additional standards for the granting or denial of individual applications for
rezoning. The courts which have upheld floating-zone ordinances have
recognized the potential danger in the case-by-case approach, and have sought
to check the possibility of arbitrary action by requiring standards separate
from and in addition to those in the state enabling act.
In the original action, the plaintiff took depositions from the three
commissioners of the Levy Court, in which statements the members outlined
their reasons for the decision on Shell's application. The supreme court held
that the depositions were inadmissible, stating: "It is well established that
the courts will not inquire into the motives of members of a legislative body
to determine the validity of legislation except where there is a showing of
fraud or bad faith."' 75 The question remains, however, whether the Levy
Court is performing a legislative function when it receives individual
requests for rezoning which are "studied and acted upon on their own
merits." A reading of some of the testimony of the Levy Court commissioners
which was held inadmissible strongly suggests that, within the framework
of the case-by-case determination, arbitrary and discriminatory action could
70
exist in the granting or denial of a rezoning request.
tural and other industries, and the protection of both urban and non-urban
development.
(b) The regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, of the character of the particular district involved, its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property values and natural
resources and the general and appropriate trend and character of land, building
and population development.
Del. at -,
183 A.2d at 580.
75. 76. Portions of the inadmissible testimony of one of the commissioners is as
follows:
Q. On the basis of the record did you feel that Shell had failed to show any
necessity for rezoning an area that large?
A. Right.
Q. Did you feel that the rezoning was not in accordance with any plan for the
development of that area?
A. It appeared to me that it was just an attempt to control as much acreage
as they could possibly control in that area. There was no need established for
that much for a refinery. Certainly not.
Q. Did you feel that the rezoning of that area should be done in accordance
with a long range plan for development of that area?
A. That was my feeling.
Q. Did you feel that the rezoning that was done was done solely for Shell?
A. There is no doubt about that. . ..
Q. Did you feel that the other two members' action was dictated solely by the
feeling that unless they rezoned all but 600 acres Shell wouldn't locate in
that area?
A. That was'my impression. . ..
Q. Rezoning so far as Shell was concerned was different from rezoning that
would be done for any other developer, was it not?
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In conclusion, the floating-zone device has been effectively used in a few
instances in undeveloped areas and may prove to be equally useful in meeting
local problems regarding industrial integration and development if the device
is recognized by the courts as a new and unique concept in zoning with its
own special problems. The goals of zoning have not changed, but new
and more flexible means are being devised, means which have yet to be
perfected and reconciled by the courts with regard to accepted zoning principles. The inherent flexibility in the floating-zone device, wherein lies its
virtue, also emphasizes its danger in application. From this examination of
the floating zone as it has been sanctioned along with certain safeguards
in some jurisdictions, it would appear that if the provision in the New Castle
County Zoning Code is a floating-zone concept, the Shell decision goes far
beyond what would be accepted in the jurisdictions of the Rogers and Huff
cases. There is no indication that any advance determination of compatibility
has been made by the Levy Court, since it has enabled itself to scatter three
broad categories of districts-residential, commercial and industrial-throughA. In what way?
Q. It was different in the sense that Shell was granted far more acreage than
they could prove the necessity for having rezoned.
A. Yes.
Q. In other situations the Levy Court would only rezone what a petitioner
had shown was necessary for his present purpose?
A. That is normal procedure.
Brief for Appellants, app. pp. A101-0.3, A108. A portion of the testimony of another
commissioner is as follows:
Q. Then did you concur that Shell should be contacted?
A. Yes, this way. We all had three different opinions. Mr. Lambert had
an opinion at first that he wanted to give them 500 or 550; then he said he
would go along with 1,000 acres. Mr. Roberts suggested 80%. I said, "Look,
I don't care whether it goes for 1,000 or 80%, I am in favor of giving the whole
thing to Shell."
Q. Why was that?
A. Because I feel that an industry coming here is going to help us, it is
going to help the community, and I felt that it was a betterment for the community itself ....
Q. So that no matter how much land had to be rezoned you felt that rezoning
ought to be granted to insure Shell's coming here, is that correct?
A. Right, for long range planning.
Brief for Appellants, app. pp. A127-28. A portion of the inadmissible testimony of the
third commissioner is as follows:
Q. Let me see if I get the general outline clear. Is it correct that you felt
that Shell had offered publicly to leave some part of the lands under option
to the Fish and Game Commission, and therefore this part ought not to be
rezoned ?
A. That is what I thought, that's right . ...
Q. Your decision that you wouldn't go along with the 20% was based on the
offer of the Shell representative to the Board of Fish and Game Commissioners,
is that correct?
A. In part, yes.
Q. What was the other part?
A. I felt that that land, I have lived there for many years, is a good ducking
spot.
Brief for Appellants, app. pp. A164-65.
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out the portions of the county zoned R-2. Also, the important problem of
the commissioners' discretion in the case-by-case determination is left unrecognized by the Delaware court, yet the valid floating-zone ordinances
have included standards, apart from those set out in the original enabling
act, which specify in advance the qualifications for favorable action on a
rezoning application and provide a substantial check on possible arbitrary
action by the commissioners. If, however, the relevant portion of the Zoning
Code was not meant to be a floating-zone provision but rather a new concept
of "delayed zoning," the analogy to the floating zone points out some serious
weaknesses in this approach.
Whatever position the Delaware courts finally take, they ought to be
disposed to thinking and speaking in terms of workable guides in contemplation of future problem areas rather than pretending the land had never
really been zoned prior to the rezoning application. The approach employed
in Shell may solve the immediate legal problems while the ultimate ones
go unheeded. The transition of the Delaware coastal area from agriculture
to heavy industry is not to be taken lightly. Although the rezoning action in
Shell may have been expedient and desirable in the broad sense, 7 7 the
precedent set by this case may well give rise to problems with regard to future
decisions of the Levy Court which may not be so easily resolved in terms of
what is clearly for the public welfare.
EDWARD B. MAXWELL II
77. An executive of Shell Oil testified before the Levy Court: (1) that the
initial installation would employ between 400 and 500 people, (2) that there will be
a yearly expenditure in the State of Delaware of roughly $12,250,000 and (3) that there
will be an additional tax revenue of $250,000 to the State. Brief for Appellees,
app. B77-78.

COMMONWEALTH EX REL. HOWELL v. HOWELL:
COLLEGE EXPENSES AS AN ELEMENT
OF SUPPORT
In Commonwealth ex rel. Howell v. Howell,' the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed a support award designated to be applied to the
college expenses of an eighteen-year-old child. The specific order appealed
from required appellant to pay the college tuition of his daughter to the
extent of the proceeds from an educational life insurance policy which he
had obtained some ten years earlier. Although the superior court affirmed,
three divergent opinions resulted concerning the elements requisite to the
law's emburdening a father with the duty to pay the college expenses of his
minor child. The elements considered in each opinion range from an express
agreement by the father to pay his child's college expenses to a determination
made solely upon general support criteria, requiring no agreement whatever
upon which to base a duty. In between these two extremes lies the opinion
of the majority, based upon neither of these avenues of recovery alone but
instead upon a theory which appears to be a hybrid of both contract and
traditional support law. This Case Note will review the support law in
Pennsylvania with reference to the matter of college expenses as an element
of the support award.
The action of support in Pennsylvania is a quasi-criminal action which
is prosecuted by the Commonwealth on behalf of the party allegedly entitled
2
to support. The duty of a father to support his unemancipated minor child
is not a contractual duty, but rather one which goes to the very roots of the
common law.3 Generally, this duty of support includes the duty to provide
such food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education as are necessary.
4
These necessaries are relative and vary with the station in life of the parties.
1. 198 Pa. Super. 396, 181 A.2d 903 (1962) (Ervin, J., and Montgomery, J.,
filed dissenting opinions. Montgomery, J., was joined by Rhodes, P. J.).
2. The word "children" as used in the Pennsylvania statute enabling the court to
order support payment was intended to denote persons under twenty-one years of age.

Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. 232, 161 Atd. 883 (1932),
construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (1953). However, the father's duty may expire
at an earlier age, upon proof that the child is self-supporting. See Commonwealth ex
rel. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303 (1929). The duty may also continue beyond
the twenty-first birthday where the child is not physically or mentally able to engage

in profitable employment, or when employment is not available to him at a supporting
wage. See Commonwealth ex rel. Groff v. Groff, 173 Pa. Super. 535, 98 A.2d 449
(1953). However, there is a presumption that when the child comes of age the reciprocal
duties between father and child cease. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. O'Malley, supra
at 234, 161 Atl. at 884.
3. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 450 (Wendell's ed. 1854).
4. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d
389 (1952).
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When a court is called upon to determine whether a certain item should be
included as an element of a support award in a particular case, it must
exercise its discretion and determine whether the item constitutes a necessary
under the circumstances. 5 Review of such determinations is normally limited
to the question of abuse of that discretion.
When the duty to provide a certain item is a contractual one, it is
immaterial whether or not the item is a necessity under the particular
circumstances presented. Contract duties generally are privately imposed
and should not be burdened with an evaluation of the criteria upon which
support awards are based. In the same vein, the determination in a support
action should not be restricted by the requirements of an enforceable agreement or anything approaching an enforceable agreement. These two avenues
of recovery are theoretically separate and, though some elements may have
mutual significance in a particular case, they are not interdependent. However, the support law in Pennsylvania now manifests itself as an offspring
of both contract and traditional support principles. This hybrid is evidenced
by the decision of the superior court in the Howell case.
The appellant was a graduate of Temple University School of Pharmacy
and sole proprietor of a pharmacy which he had owned for over twenty years.
The mother was also a college graduate. Their daughter graduated from
high school in 1961 in the fourth quintile of her class. She then was admitted
to Temple Community College in the secretarial course." In 1952 the North
Carolina Mutual Insurance Company had issued an endowment policy in
the face amount of $1500 on the life of the daughter, who was then nine years
of age.' The appellant was the named beneficiary in the policy and had
exercised complete ownership and control over the policy including the
payment of premiums. It had always been within appellant's powex to
exercise the borrowing privileges under the policy and to use the proceeds
for any purpose he should desire," although at the time the policy was issued,
it was appellant's intention to use the proceeds for the higher education of
his daughter. 9 The lower court refused to consider the ability of the daughter
to support herself, her aptitude for advanced education, or the general financial
ability of the appellant to pay for her college education.' 0 The lower court
found no enforceable agreement upon which its decision could be based, but
instead relied upon the intention of appellant expressed at the time the
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Dugan v. Dugan, 162 Pa. Super. 10, 56 A.2d
683 (1948).
6. Record, Vol. II, p. 5a.
7. Supplemental Brief for Appellant, p. 2.
8. Supplemental Brief for Appellant, 1).
4.
9. Record, Vol. I, p. 3a.
10. Record, Vol. I, p. 2a.
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insurance contract was entered into, that his daughter should receive advanced
education. The court appeared to treat this expression of intention as if it
were an enforceable agreement which rendered unnecessary an examination
of support criteria."
The majority opinion in the superior court held that the circumstances
warranted the award within the framework of the law as stated in Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Martin,12 and that the lower court had not abused
its discretion, even though there was no express agreement. In the Martin
case the father was held liable for the college expenses of his minor child.
One reason given was that the father had set up an insurance trust agreement to educate his children. However, the insurance policy in the Martin
case was held to be a confirmation of an agreement between Martin and his
wife providing for the child's education. In the Howell case there was no
evidence of an agreement between Howell and his wife for the policy to
confirm.
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Montgomery in the Howell case,
concurred in by President Judge Rhodes, the belief was expressed that under
proper circumstances an express agreement is not necessary and, whether or
not such agreement is found, the court must still weigh the financial ability of
the father in making any such award.' 3 Judge Ervin also dissented, his
opinion being that in order for a father to be held financially responsible
for a child while in college, the court must find an express agreement and
in addition must weigh the father's financial ability to undertake this burden. 4
Judge Ervin is thus the only one who would require an express agreement
under all circumstances, while all three dissenting judges would require an
evaluation of the father's general financial ability before any such award
could be made. This evaluation of the father's overall financial ability is
common to all support actions. On the other hand, the majority would require
something less than an express agreement, yet they would not require the
evaluation of general support criteria, at least not to the extent of a thorough
examination of factors such as the father's overall financial ability.
11. See Record, Vol. II, p. 18a.
12. 196 Pa. Super. 355, 358, 175 A.2d 138, 139 (1961), where the court held:
In the absence of an express contract, and unless the circumstances warrant it,
On the
a parent is not liable for the support of a child attending college ....
other hand, where there is an agreement to support and it is within the contemplation of the parties, a father may be liable to support and furnish his
child with a college education. (Emphasis added.)
13. 198 Pa. Super. at 404, 181 A.2d at 907. Judge Montgomery expressed the view
that the father's finances should have been evaluated; he then explained his dissent
in light of Judge Woodside's concurring opinion in Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v.
Martin, supra note 12, at 360, 175 A.2d at 140, in which he and Judge Flood had joined,
wherein the belief was voiced that no express agreement need be required today.
198 Pa. Super. at 399, 181 A.2d at 906-07. Judge Ervin construed PA. STAT.
which requires fathers to be of "sufficient ability to pay,"
as applying to the agreement situation also.
14.

ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (1953),
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In order to appreciate fully the relative merits of the three opinions, it
is necessary to analyze the evolution of this problem. The underlying conflict
within this problem area has been well summarized as follows:
The education of children in a manner suitable to their station and
calling, is another branch of parental duty, of imperfect obligation
generally in the eye of the municipal law, but of very great importance to the welfare of the state. .

.

. A parent who sends his

son into the world uneducated, and without skill in any art or
science, does a great injury to mankind, as well as to his own family,
for he defrauds the community of a useful citizen, and bequeaths to
it a nuisance. 15

Generally a father is held to be under a legal duty to provide his wife
and children with necessaries suitable to their condition. 6 There appears to
be agreement that certain educational achievements are necessary in every
case. The difficulty arises over the determination of the education level to be
considered necessary in a given fact situation. At first glance, this problem
would appear to be a modern one. On the contrary, it is a recurring one with
the level of education being the only changing factor. In 1929, the court was
17
faced with this same problem in Commonwealth ex rel. Gilmore v. Gilmore,
which involved a father's petition to vacate a support order for a son who
had reached sixteen years of age, the age at which compulsory school
attendance ceased. In dismissing the petition, the court held that a father
may be required to give his minor children such education in the public
schools as reasonably accords with the father's ability and position in life,
as well as the child's educational ability, progress, and prospects.' 8 The
court realized that education was a factor to be considered in the determination of the support and maintenance award and that the level necessary
was relative to a given set of circumstances before the court at a particular
time. The superior court followed the rationale set forth in the Gilmore
case in Commonwealth ex rel. Gillen v. Gillen,19 where it was stated that a
father of modest financial means should not be required to maintain and to
send to college two sons who were almost of majority age. The court, however, did not preclude the inclusion of college expenses in a support award
where the evaluation of proper support criteria warrants their inclusion. The
importance here lies not in what was decided but in the fact that support
determination criteria, such as the financial condition of the father, were
considered by the court in making its decision. Previous to Howell, however,
15.

KENT, COMMENTARIES

196 (12th ed. 1873).

16. Commonwealth ex rel. Adler v. Adler, supra note 4; see also Commonwealth
ex rel. Bowie v. Bowie, 89 Pa. Super. 288 (1926).
17. Supra note 2.
18. Id. at 308.
19. 102 Pa. Super. 136, 156 Atl. 572 (1931).
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although a provision for education had been referred to as an element which
might or might not be properly includable in a support award, such an
element was never in fact included in any award in the absence of an express
agreement.
In 1944, in Commonwealth ex rel. Binney v. Binney, 20 the superior court
handed down a decision which virtually renounced college expenses as a
possible factor in a maintenance and support award. The case involved a
father's appeal from an order which required him to pay fifty dollars per
week for the support of his wife and minor children, and to pay $1500
annually for the maintenance and education of a nineteen-year-old son
attending college. Upon finding no agreement by appellant that such payment
be made, the superior court vacated that part of the order relating to the son
at college. The court reasoned that worthy parents all over the world do
not furnish their offspring with college education and no one says that they
have a legal duty to the child or to the state. The court continued that a
parent "is entitled to a measure of discretion, and must be allowed to exercise
his own judgment." 21 This line of reasoning was carried to its logical
extreme in Commonwealth ex rel. Rice v. Rice, 22 where the court said:
If a court could compel a father who is separated from his wife
and children to maintain his children at college it could compel
parents not separated from their children to do likewise. Thus, the
courts and not the parents would determine who should and who
should not have a college education and the type of education to be
afforded. We have not yet arrived at this state of paternalism.
This same argument was rejected by the Washington Supreme Court
in its consideration of Esteb v. Esteb.23 The court there reasoned that when
the father has custody of the child the law presumes that he will "properly"
educate him, but when the father does not have custody, he does not have
the child's talents and abilities exhibited before him daily and therefore might
not fully appreciate them. Also, when the father is deprived of the child's
custody, which is often the case when parents are separated or divorced,
he might refuse to do what a father's natural instinct would normally prompt
24
him to do.
Since 1944, a number of cases 25 have been decided which rely on
20. 146 Pa. Super. 374, 22 A.2d 598 (1944).
21. Id. at 380, 22 A.2d at 601.
22. 1 Adams L.J. 91, 92 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
23. 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).
24. Id. at 184, 244 Pac. at 267.
25. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cooke, 34 Del. Co. 395 (Pa. C.P. 1946), where
the court held that a father may be compelled to support his son through high school
even after the child has exceeded the statutory attendance requirement, but may not be
compelled to finance him through college, even though the latter course was well within
his financial means.
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Commonwealth ex rel. Binney v. Binney,26 the case which virtually canonized
the father's discretion in this area. In Commonwealth v. Wingert,27 the court
refused a petition for increased support to pay the college expenses for a
daughter seventeen years of age. The court based its decision on the
utility of the course pursued and ignored the professional status of the
parents, the relatively high income of the father ($22,500), and the exceptional abilities of the child. The school was classified as a finishing school
by the court, and one which would not prepare her for any particular station
in life. The court also felt that the school may merely have represented an
avenue for continued support.
In Commonwealth v. Cisney,28 the court relied on the Binney and Wingert
cases and held that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, a father could
not be compelled to contribute to the support of a child attending college.2
The court made no attempt to foresee what these unusual circumstances might
prove to be. It thus appears that the language used by the superior court
in the Binney and Wingert cases was interpreted by most lower courts as
a definite prohibition against the inclusion of college expenses in a maintenance and support award, or extension of support through the college years
of the minor, under any circumstances except the most unusual ones. Usually
nothing less than an express agreement would be acceptable. This reliance
on the Binney decision is still with us today as evidenced by the dissenting
opinion of Judge Ervin in the Howell case.
As the courts became more cognizant of the value of advanced education,
they became more willing to find an agreement to which they could attach
an order for the payment of college expenses by the father. An example of
this trend is Commonwealth ex rel. Stomel v. Stomel,30 which involved an
appeal by the defendant-father from an order directing him to pay fifty
dollars per week for the support of his wife and two sons, and in addition
directing him to pay the college tuition of the two sons. One son was nineteen
years of age and in college. The other son was a seventeen-year-old high
school graduate who was enrolled in college, but had not yet begun his
studies. The agreement found was not a written one, but a statement in open
court by the father to the effect that he agreed to support his wife and the
younger son. The court was to determine the amount. Judge Ervin, who
expressed the opinion of the court, found the order not excessive as to the
son agreed upon, but refused to extend the order to the older son not agreed
26. Supra note 20.
27. 173 Pa. Super. 613, 98 A.2d 203 (1953).
28. 6 Cumb. L.J. 95 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
29. Accord, Commonwealth v. Fleming, 17 Monroe L.R. 9 (Pa. C.P. 1955);
Commonwealth v. Yoh, 71 Montg. Co. L.R. 20 (Pa. C.P. 1953) (dictum).
30. 180 Pa. Super. 573, 119 A.2d 597 (1956).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

upon. The court held that at the time the father made the agreement to
support the younger son, he knew that he was enrolled in college, and therefore that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the father should
pay for his son's tuition at college. This decision would seem to show a
tendency by the court, once an agreement is found, to extend the liability
under the agreement to cover a college education even where college expenses
are not expressly an element. The decision in the Stomel case would still
31
seem to represent Judge Ervin's interpretation of the law.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman,32 the superior court
again demonstrated that, in absence of a contract, it would not recognize any
legal duty imposed upon a father to educate his child after high school, but
that once a contractual duty could be found, it would look to the circumstances
of the case to determine what this duty entailed. In Grossman, the father had
entered into a support agreement whereby he was to pay fifty dollars per
week for the support of his wife and twenty-five dollars per week for the
support of his children until the younger son had "completed his schooling."
Upon the son's graduation from high school, the father filed a petition to
vacate the order. The court, however, found it to be within the contemplation
of the parties that the father would pay for his son's support while hewas
attending college. In making this determination, Judge Ervin looked to the
income and professional status of the father and the scholastic achievements
and potential of the child, and found that the court below properly refused to
33
allow vacation of the support order.
34
The decision in the case of Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Martin,
which was handed down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 1961,
was relied upon by the majority in the Howell case. In the Martin case the
defendant-father had expressly agreed to provide his daughter with a "secondary education beyond high school."' 3 5 He had entered into an insurance trust
agreement (the policy being on his life) to provide his daughters with an
education. 36 The court found the insurance trust to be a confirmation of the
express agreement entered into by the husband and wife at the time of their
divorce; it was this agreement upon which the decision was based, rather
31. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
32. 188 Pa. Super. 236, 146 A.2d 315 (1959).
33. Accord, Commonwealth v. Byerly, 9 Chest. Co. Rep. 260 (Pa. C.P. 1960);
but cf. Commonwealth v. Kinek, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 467 (C.P. 1961).
34. Supra note 12.
35. Record, p. 16a, Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Martin, supra note 12.
36. The Orphans' Court of Westmoreland County found that the trust agreement
was intended to provide funds for educational expenses even before the father's death
and decreed that the trustee borrow against the loan value of the policy for the purpose
of providing funds for the daughter's education. This decree had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Martin v. Martin, 405 Pa. 282, 174 A.2d 663 (1961),
prior to the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision of the support dispute.
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than the existence of the insurance trust itself. President Judge Rhodes
in writing the majority opinion expressed the state of the law in the following
manner: "In the absence of an express contract, and unless the circumstances
warrant it, a parent is not liable for the support of a child attending college ....
On the other hand, where there is an agreement to support and it is within
the contemplation of the parties, a father may be liable to support and furnish
his child with a college education. ''37 A concurring opinion voiced the
belief that an express agreement should not be required.38
The court in the Howell case, however, found no enforceable agreement
which gave rise to a contractual duty although they did use contract talk
when they held that a college education was within the contemplation of
the parties at the time Howell manifested the intention to send his child to
college.8 9 It would appear that the court regarded the insurance policy
as evidence of an intention on the part of the father to provide his child with
a college education, or as evidence that it had once been within the contemplation of the parties that the child would go to college. Normally, an
appraisal of what was in the contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was entered into is conducted in order to determine what the contract
actually entailed. One is curious, however, as to the value of this process
when no enforceable agreement was found to exist. Although a consideration
of what was in the contemplation of the parties at some prior time could
have some materiality in the absence of an agreement, namely, in an action
based on general support determinants, its value would be to show that these
parents are of the type who would send their children to college. In that
setting, however, it would be only one of a number of factors considered in
determining the support award rather than a requirement which is given
equal status with an enforceable agreement. 40 What if there had been no
insurance policy involved in the Howell case? In all probability it would then
have been necessary for the court to resolve the case upon basic support principles which should involve at least a cursory consideration of the father's
financial condition as well as other support criteria. One would think that the
existence of the policy should not of itself materially change this procedure.
It was merely an asset over which the father held the exclusive rights, and
should have been considered as only one factor in the overall financial picture
of the father.
37. Supra note 12.
38. Supra note 12, at 360, 175 A.2d at 140.
39. 198 Pa. Super. at 399, 181 A.2d at 905.
40. The majority in Howell seems to be interpreting the requirements stated in
the summary of the law in Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Martin, supra note 12, in
the disjunctive rather than in the conjunction as written.

41.

See discussion in Commonwealth v. Cisney, supra note 28, at 97.
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Perhaps the use of the intention upon which the decision in the Howell
case was based represents a transitional step between the requirement of an
agreement and an award based solely upon general support action criteria.
The courts have always recognized the possibility that under unusual circumstances provision for advanced education might be includable in a support
award notwithstanding the absence of an agreement to that effect, 41 but have
never been willing to find these circumstances in a given case or to project
what might be required. The agreement concept has been stretched in every
possible case to include provision for college expenses within the contemplation
of the parties. 42 The court in the Howell case, however, could find no
agreement in the first instance; therefore, it was constrained to adopt a
transitional approach which retained as many of the remnants of the agreement concept as possible.
It is not intended here to question the result in the Howell case, but
it is contended that the decision should have been based upon a thorough
evaluation of the factors which generally are considered in any support award,
rather than upon a rationalization of result via contract analogy. The determinants of a support award are considered by courts so that the amount and
duration of the award are reasonable and just. By rationalizing its decision
by use of a contract theory, the court has possibly lost sight of the proper
criteria and has paved the way for possible injustice in the future. The courts
of Pennsylvania have traditionally recognized that there might be unusual
circumstances where a father could be held liable for his child's college
expenses in the absence of an agreement; however, by holding that a mere
intention will satisfy this requirement, as was done in the Howell case, the
court has relaxed the requirements and safeguards of an agreement without
imposing the requirements and safeguards of an award based on the evaluation
43
of support criteria.
If in a given set of circumstances the court finds a college education
to be a necessity for a particular individual, one would think that support
should continue at least for his minority years if he attends college, even though
he might be capable of self support. This is in effect the same problem which
existed in 1929 when the superior court in Commonwealth ex rel. Gilmore
v. Gilmore,44 held that support should continue during the child's public
schooling even though the statutory minimum

child was capable of self support.

45

had been exceeded and the

The distinction lies in the advanced

42. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stomel v. Stomel, supra note 30.
43. Evidence was proffered in the Howell case which, if it had been admitted, would
have shown that Howell's income was $3500 or less per year. 198 Pa. Super. at 400, 181
A.2d at 905. Should not this evidence have been considered by the court?
44. Supra note 2.

45.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 24, §§ 13-1326 to -1327 (1962).
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level of education necessary today as compared to that required in 1929.
Why then do not the courts of Pennsylvania include expenses for higher
education as an element of the support and maintenance award when a
thorough evaluation of general support criteria reveals the propriety of this
result? This course is supported by numerous writers 46 and is followed in
47
a growing number of jurisdictions.
JAMES D. MCDONALD, JR.
46. See 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 108 (1960) ; 31 Miss. L.J. 285 (1960) ; 35 NOTRE
573 (1960); 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1960); 36 TUL. L. REv. 367 (1962).

DAME LAW.

47. Strom v. Strom, 13 II. App. 2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957); See Pass v.
Pass, 239 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super. 26, 69 A.2d
752 (1949) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396 (1960) ; Calogeras
v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio 1959); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d
860 (1941) ; Esteb v. Esteb, supra note 23.

FRAZIER v. OIL CHEMICAL CO.: RIGHTS OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA'S WRONGFUL
DEATH ACT
In a recent case, Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co.,' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that illegitimate children have no right to participate in an
action brought under the Wrongful Death Act 2 for the negligent killing of
their putative father or to share in the damages recovered. The plaintiff, as
widow and personal representative of the estate of the deceased, brought an
action in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County against Oil
Chemical Company under the Wrongful Death Act and the survival statute3
for the recovery of damages for the death of Claude Frazier. A petition to
intervene in this action was filed by the mother of two illegitimate children
of the decedent. The grounds assigned for intervention were that the complaint
did not include these children who, as "survivors of their father Claude
Frazier . . . would be entitled to their proportionate share as children of
any damages recoverable for his death." 4 The court dismissed the petition
to intervene and the petitioner appealed.
In affirming the order of the lower court, the supreme court considered
the following provision in the Wrongful Death Act: "The persons entitled
to recover . . . shall be the husband, widow, children, or parents of the
deceased, and no other relatives . . .and the sum recovered shall go to them
in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in case of
intestacy . . . ."5 The court then decided that the word "children," as used
in the act, denotes legitimate children, mainly because an illegitimate child is
given no right of inheritance from his putative father by the Intestate Act."
The court emphasized that its decision was necessitated by the language of
1. 407 Pa. 78, 179 A.2d 202 (1962).
2.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-04

(1953).

Section 1601 provides: "Whenever

death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence . . . the widow of any
such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an
action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."
3. The supreme court did not consider the question whether the petitioners could
share in any recovery under the survival statute, since that action proceeds as if the
decedent were suing for his personal pecuniary loss, and whatever is recovered goes
to his estate. Therefore, those entitled to recover would be only those to whom the

estate is distributable. In any event, declared the court, the action under the survival
statute would properly be brought in the Orphans' Court. 407 Pa. at 80-81, 179 A.2d
at 204.
4. Brief for Appellee, p. 21, Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., supra note 1.
5.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).

6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7(a) (1950), provides as follows: "For purposes
of descent by, from and through an illegitimate, he shall be considered the child of
his mother but not of his father."
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the statute, and stated: "Any correction of this situation and an equation
of the rights of illegitimates with those of legitimates must come not from
this Court but from the legislature."7 It is not the purpose of this Note to
question the result in Frazier, but to examine the desirability of equating the
rights of illegitimates and legitimates under the Wrongful Death Act.
The wrongful death statute was designed to provide a means by which
those who suffered a loss by reason of the wrongful death of a near relative
would be able to bring an action against the wrongdoers and recover in
damages." "[Tihe damages recoverable are measured by the pecuniary loss
occasioned to them through deprivation of the part of the earnings of the
deceased which they would have received from him had he lived." 9 The
intent was that those who had been dependent upon the deceased for maintenance might now be able to obtain a recovery from which they could
support themselves, maintain their dignity, and not become a burden on
society. The Intestate Act, on the other hand, was designed to provide for
"the descent of the real and personal estates of persons dying intestate."' 0
To achieve this purpose, the Intestate Act sets forth a preferentially ordered
list of those capable of inheritance. The illegitimate child is excluded by
this list from inheriting from his father in Pennsylvania. Taking the Wrongful Death Act and the Intestate Act then, and classifying them according to
their purposes, it might be said that basically the Wrongful Death Act
provides for an action for support, while the Intestate Act is clearly a law
governing inheritance. The Wrongful Death Act is properly so categorized
because it is limited to those enumerated relatives who can show a loss

of support occasioned by the death of the deceased, and because the damages
recoverable are measured by the pecuniary value of the support that was lost."
This distinction between the purposes of these two pieces of legislation
renders questionable the propriety of using the Intestate Act to limit those
entitled to share in the recovery tinder the Wrongful Death Act. Some
courts have disallowed attempted interjection of inheritance laws into this
type of remedial legislation where the illegitimate child is concerned. In
Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,1 2 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in deciding on the illegitimate's rights under the Death onl the High
Seas Act," stated:
7. 407 Pa. at 89, 179 A.2d at 208.
8. Pezzuli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942).
9. Id. at 647, 26 A.2d at 661. (Emphasis added.)
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.1 (1950) (Historical Note).
11. Pezzuli v. D'Ambrosia, supra note 8.
12. 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934).
13. 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958). Like the FELA, the
Death on the High Seas Act provides a right of action for negligently caused death,
specifically, those deaths occurring on the high seas. The purpose of the act is to
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There is no right of inheritance involved here. It is a statute
that confers recovery upon dependents, not for the benefit of an
estate, but for those who by our standards are legally or morally
entitled to support. Humane considerations and the realization that
children are such no matter what their origin alone might compel
us to the construction that, under present day conditions, our social
attitude warrants a construction different from that of the early
English view. The purpose and object of the statute is to continue
the support of dependents after a casualty. To hold that these [illegitimate] children or the parents do not come within the terms of
the act would be to defeat the purposes of the act. .

.

. The rule

is nullius filius [child of no one] applies only in cases
that a bastard 14
of inheritance.
While the court in Middleton was not faced with the Pennsylvania Intestate
Act, it was dealing with the common law, which the Pennsylvania Intestate
Act adopted as to the right of an illegitimate to inherit from his father.
The reasoning employed in Middleton, however, would seem to be no
more than a policy argument against the use of the Intestate Act, unless it
were shown that the illegitimate child is, in fact, being deprived of a right
by his exclusion from recovery for wrongful death. It would seem that
unless the illegitimate had some right which he could exercise against his
father to gain support before his death, he would have no complaint at being
excluded from those entitled to share in a recovery under the Wrongful
Death Act after his death.
Under the common law, the illegitimate child was considered nullius
filius and as such was denied the right of inheritance or support from his
putative father. 15 Pennsylvania courts have followed this common-law rule
and have stated that a putative father "has no duty of 'support' as the term is
used."' 6 By this' it is meant that there is no duty of support that can be
imposed in a civil suit, but rather that the duty is imposed by statute in a
criminal action, 17 with the order of support being part of the sentence. Although the illegitimate has no right which the court would recognize in a
civil suit, he does have a right to initiate a criminal action which, upon proper
compensate those persons who, by reason of the wrongful death, have lost a substantial right of support. Lawson v. United States, 192 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
14. 70 F.2d at 329-30.
15. See Robbins & Deik, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children:
A Comparative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 308 (1930).
16. Commonwealth v. Campagne, 40 Pa. D. & C. 478 (C.P. 1940) (dictum).
17. This action could proceed under either PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (1951)
(fornication and bastardy), or PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4732 (1945) (neglect to
support a bastard child). Furthermore, the promise by an illegitimate not to bring
a criminal action for support against the father is deemed sufficient consideration to
bind the father to a contract for the payment of support to the child. See Rohrheimer
v. Winters, 126 Pa. 253, 17 Atl. 606 (1889).
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proof and conviction, would obtain support for him. It is true that upon the
putative father's death, the illegitimate would be deprived of his right
to obtain support by means of a criminal action.' 8 However, the importance
of this right to support in the present context lies in the recognition, by the
legislature, of the duty rather than the circumstances under which it is
enforced. The intent of the legislature in imposing this duty was "to
ameliorate the injustice of the common law in relation to the status and
rights of illegitimate children, and to convert the moral duty of the father into
a legal obligation to provide for their support and maintenance."' 9 It would
seem that the reasoning behind the creation of this right should be carried
over to give an illegitimate child a right to share in the sum recovered under
the Wrongful Death Act. Before suggesting a possible remedy, however, it
would be well to consider some of the policy reasons behind limiting those
who can share in the sum recovered under the Wrongful Death Act to those
entitled to take of the deceased had he died intestate.
One of the obvious advantages in using the Intestate Act to limit those
who could share in a recovery under the Wrongful Death Act is that it
provides a ready-made, time-tested order of distribution of the amount
recovered. This order of distribution is further desirable because those
entitled to take under the intestate laws are very often the same people whose
loss of support the Wrongful Death Act was intended to compensate. It
also eliminates possible quibbling over the respective amounts of recovery.
Although the act limits recovery to "husband, widow, children, or parents of
the deceased and no other relatives, ' 20 there still would be a greater possibility
of these individuals contesting an ad hoc apportionment than there is with
an order of distribution.
Thus it is seen that limiting those entitled to share in the sum recovered
under the Wrongful Death Act to those entitled to take of the deceased in
case of intestacy does have merit. The use of the intestacy distribution
performs a far greater service than it does harm. The problems of distribution will arise more times than will an illegitimate's claim. Any modification of the Wrongful Death Act, therefore, should by no means eliminate
this method of distribution. A possible revision of the pertinent provision
of the act would be as follows:
. . . and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion in
which they would take his or her personal estate in case of intestacy,
except illegitimate children shall share in the sum recovered as
though they were legitimate.
18. A criminal action cannot be brought against a dead man, and criminal penalties
terminate upon death. Commonwealth v. Moran, 251 Pa. 477, 96 Atl. 1089 (1916).
19. Commonwealth v. Bertram, 143 Pa. Super. 1, 3, 16 A.2d 758, 759 (1940).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
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With this modification the act would better serve its purpose, without unduly
expanding its coverage. The illegitimate child would have to meet all the
requirements that the legitimate child must meet in addition to the difficult
burden of proving paternity. This would avoid the unfortunate result in
the Frazier case.
An examination of similar federal legislation, to detect a possible trend
to accord illegitimates equality with legitimates, 21 would be of value in determining whether the above-suggested change in the Wrongful Death Act should
be made.

22
is
The main purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act

to provide the employees of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce
with a uniform right of action for negligently caused injuries. 23 The FELA
also provides for a right of recovery by the surviving dependents in case of
a covered employee's negligently caused death.2 4 It is this part of the act
that is pertinent to this inquiry. The FELA is similar to the Wrongful Death
Act in that it uses the word "children" in setting forth the beneficiaries of
the award.2 5 The courts of Pennsylvania have never decided whether illegitimates are to be included in the interpretation of the word "children" as
used in the FELA. There are only two cases where the issue has been
resolved. The first was Hiser v. Davis,26 in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that "the interpretation of the word 'child' or 'children' in such
a federal statute, as including or not including illegitimate children, depends
'27
The court
upon the law of the state wherein the statute is being enforced.
pointed out that in New York the word "child" in a statute or a will, without
'more qualification, means a legitimate child. The second case, Hammond v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 28 was decided by the New Jersey Superior Court in 1959.
Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1021 (Supp. 1962),
illegitimate children have been permitted to recover for the death of their father.
21.

77, §§ 1-1025 (1952),

Smrekar v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 137 Pa. Super. 183, 8 A.2d 461 (1939).
However, the Workmen's Compensation Act specifically provides that the terms "child"

and "children" shall include children to whom the decedent stood in loco parentis
and who were members of the decedent's household at the time of his death. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1962). This provision has enabled children of no relationship

whatsoever to the decedent to recover a compensation award. Mayfield v. Kerr, 102 Pa.
Super. 532, 157 At. 506 (1931).

22. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
23. See HANNA, FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE INJURIES 106-13 (1955).
24. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
25. Ibid.
26. 234 N.Y. 300, 137 N.E. 596 (1922).
27. Id. at 305, 137 N.E. at 597-98. For this proposition the court relied upon
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916), an early case construing the
FELA which held that "next of kin" as mentioned therein must be determined by
'reference to applicable local law. The specific question presented in Seaboard was
whether legitimate brothers and sisters of an illegitimate decedent were his next of
kin because of their common motherhood.
28. 54 N.J. Super. 149, 148 A.2d 515 (1959).
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In deciding the case against the illegitimate children, the court relied upon the
Hiser case. It held that the word "child" must be interpreted according to
the law of the state, and then stated that under common law in New Jersey,
the illegitimate is nullius filius and as such has no right of inheritance from
his father. The court also cited the New Jersey law of Descent and Distribution of Intestate Property,2 9 which provides that illegitimates can inherit
only by or through their maternal heirs or next of kin. On appeal, however,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the lower court,
30
The
holding that illegitimate children are "children" within the FELA.
court decided that, so long as its interpretation of the act did not disrupt
state domestic policy, the interpretation should accord with the purpose and
policy of the act, which is to compensate the surviving dependents who have
suffered pecuniary loss. If the illegitimate falls into this category, he should
be compensated. Regarding compatibility with state policy, the court concluded that this issue "calls for a judicial determination upon a reference
to that part of the state law which relates to the subject matter of the federal
act."' 31 The court then decided that to allow the illegitimate to take under
the FELA in no way disturbs domestic policy in New Jersey, but on the
contrary, benefits it.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in this decision has put the doctrine
of nullius filius in its proper perspective. Nullius filius should be limited to
questions of inheritance,3 2 and should not be incorporated without question
in a remedial statute such as the FELA. Considering that the New Jersey
and Pennsylvania intestate laws are similar, there would seem to be no
domestic policy preventing Pennsylvania courts from reaching results like
that reached in Hammond under the FELA. Furthermore, this reasoning
would seem to support the proposed modification to the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act. Apart from the question whether the doctrine of nullius filius
should be retained in any situation, there would seem no valid reason for
importing it into such remedial legislation.
EDWARD

C. ROBERTS

29. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 3A:4-1 to 4-12 (1953). Section 3A:4-7 deals with the
rights of illegitimate children. The superior court also cited Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Kenney, mipra note 27, for the proposition that the word "children," as used in
the FELA, should be determined in accordance with state law.
30. Hammond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 31 N.J. 244, 156 A.2d 689 (1959).
31. Id. at 250, 156 A.2d at 692.
32. Query, whether there is any modern justification for retaining this doctrine
even for inheritance purposes.

